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Section 1. CONTRACT DFYRnMD.
A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach
of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which
the law in some way recognizes as a duty.
Annotation:
This section is copibd verbatim in Kellum v. Browning's Adm.,
231 Ky. 308, 314; 21 S. W. (2d) 459 (1929).
*Note.-.The annotating of the Restatement is being done by the
members of the faculty of the College of Law, University of Kentucky,
in cooperation with the Kentucky Bar Association. It is an attempt
to make the Restatement more valuable to the profession as well as
to clarify the law of contracts by collecting Kentucky decisions and
statutory references under appropriate sections. No authority has
been found for some of the statements and others are supported or
opposed only by dicta, which has been indicated as such. Under other
sections, particularly where there is little or no question as to the
established principle, there has been no attempt to list all the decisions but preference has been given to the most recent decisions, to
those containing the greatest wealth of citations, or to those that
are the most difficult to find by use of the digests and usual reference
books.
Other chapters of the 'Restatement with Annotations will be published In subsequent issues of the KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL.
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The Kentucky cases have usually defined a contract as an "agreement" and follow the statement here in requiring legal efficacy. "To
amount to a contract, the agreement must be of a nature to produce a
binding result upon the mutual relations of the parties." Tucker v.
Sheeran Bros. & Co., 155 Ky. 670, 672; 160 S. W. 176 (1913). But in a
few decisions, the term has been loosely used to refer to promises or
agreements that have no legal effect. See the annotations of Sections
12 and 96.

Section 2. PROMISE DEPINED.
(1) A promise is an undertaking, however expressed,
either that something shall happen, or that something shall
not happen, in the future.
(2) Words which in terms promise the happening or
failure to happen of something not within human control, or
the existence or non-existence of a present or past state of
facts, are to be interpreted as a promise or undertaking to be
answerable for such proximate damage as may be caused by
the failure to happen or the happening of the specified event, or
by the existence or non-existence of the asserted state of facts.
Annotation:
Subdivision (1). "A promise is an express undertaking or agreement to carry the purpose into effect, a declaration which binds the
person who makes it, either in honor, conscience, or law, to do or forbear a certain specific act." Hoskins v. Black, 190 Ky. 98, 101; 226
S. W. 384 (1920). In the above case and in Harrow v. Dugan, 36 Ky.
(6 Dana) 341 (1838), a statement of indebtedness made by the debtor
was held to import a promise to pay it.
As to implied promises see Section 5, infra.
Subdivision (2). This statement is illustrated by warranties in
the sales of goods which, if broken, allows the purchaser to retain the
goods and sue for damages. Junius H. Stone Corp. v. Princeton Ice
Co. 212 Ky. 404, 279 S. W. 642 (1920); Frick & Lindsey Co. v. Holbrook,
202 Ky. 416, 259 S. W. 1033 (1924).

Section 3. AGREEMENT DES'INED.
An agreement is an expression of mutual assent by two or
more persons.
Comment:
a. Agreement has a wider meaning than contract, bargain
or promise. The word contains no implication that legal consequences are or are not produced. It applies to transactions
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executed on one or both sides, and also to those that are wholly
executory.
Annotation:
"An agreement has been well expressed to consist in two persons
being of the same mind concerning the matter agreed upon. But many
agreements do not produce any legal effect on the relations of the
parties." Tucker v. Pete Sheeran Bros. & Co., 155 Ky. 670, 672; 160
S. W. 176 (1913).

"An agreement is the expression by two or more persons of a
common intention to affect their legal relations; it consists in their
being of the same mind and intention concerning the matter agreed
upon." Dixie Fire Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 153 Ky. 677, 679; 156 S. W. 140
(1913).

Section 4. BARGAIN DEFINED.
A bargain is an agreement of two or more persons to
exchange promises or performances.
Comment:
a. Bargain has a narrower meaning than agreement, since
it is applicable only to a particular class of agreements. It has
a broader meaning than contract, because it includes not only
transactions of which a promise forms a part, but also completely executed transactions such as exchanges of goods
(barters) or of services, or sales where goods have been transferred and the price paid for them. It also includes transactions where one party makes a promise and the other gives
something in exchange which is insufficient consideration.
Annotation:
This term is seemingly not defined by the Kentucky Courts.

Section 5. How A PROMISE IMLAY BE MADE.
Except as stated in Section 72 (2), a promise in a contract
must be stated in such words either oral or written, or must
be inferred wholly or partly from such conduct, as justifies the
promisee in understanding that the promisor intended to make
a promise.
Comment:
a. Contracts are often spoken of as express or implied. The
distinction involves, however, no difference in legal effect, but
lies merely in the mode of manifesting assent. Implied contracts must be distinguished from quasi-contracts, which also
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have often been called implied contracts or contracts implied in
law. Quasi-contracts, unlike true contracts, are not based on
the apparent intention of the parties to undertake the performances in question, nor are they promises. They are obligations
created by law for reasons of justice. Such obligations were
ordinarily enforced at common law in the same form of action
(assumpsit) that was appropriate to true contracts, and some
confusion with reference to the nature of quasi-contracts has
been caused thereby.
Annotation:
This section is quoted verbatim in Kellum v. Browning's Administrator, 231 Ky. 308, 21 S. W. (2d) 459 (1929). See also Section 21,
infra.
An expression of willingness is not a promise. Cumberland & 0.
V. R. R. Co. v. Shelbyville, B. & 0. R. R. Co., 117 Ky. 95, 77 S. W. 690
(1903). An acknowledgment of gratitude on the part of one receiving
services is not sufficient to imply a promise nor is the expression of a
wish or desire that the person rendering them should be compensated.
Oliver v. Gardner, 192 Ky. 89, 93; 232 S. W. 418 (1921). A written
statement that the writer feels bound and disposed to pay a preexisting debt of another is not a promise. Bright's Exr. v. Bright, 47
Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 194 (1847); Bishop v. Newman's Exr., 168 Ky. 238,
182 S. W. 165 (1916).
As ageneral rule, a request for service implies a promise to pay
for them-Ransom v. Milward, 6 K. L. L 252 (188&); Coleman v.
Simpson, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) 166 (1834). And even if there is no request,
the acceptance of the services or benefits with knowledge that pay Is
expected may imply a promise to pay-Caskey v. Williams Bros., 227
Ky. 73, 11 (2d) S. W. 991 (1928) (acceptance of delivery of horses
with knowledge of the price asked by the vendor); Star Drilling Machine Co. v. McLeod, 122 Ky. 564, 92 S. W. 558 (1906) (retention and
use of a machine offered for sale). However, receipt of benefits without this knowledge is not sufficient to create a legal duty to pay-Viley
v. Pettit, 96 Ky. 576 (1895). And under our Hospitality Act (K. S.
2178) this implication does not arise upon receipt of board and lodging
from one other than an innkeeper or keeper of a house of private
entertainment-Evans' Adm. v. MocVey, 172 Ky. 1, 188 S. W. 1075 (1916)
but the statute does not apply to clothing and nursing-Thomas v.
Arthur, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 245 (1870); Frailey's Adm. v. Thompson,
20 K. L. R. 1179, 49 S. W. 13 (1899). And at best, such promises,
whether based on a request or receipt of benefits, are mere Inferences
of fact, and may be rebutted by showing an Intent to render the
services gratuitously-St. Joseph's Orphan Society v. Wolpert, 80 Ky.
86 (1882); Miller v. Cropper, 16 K. Lt R. 395 (1894), or by showing
that the recipient justifiably believed they were so rendered-Evans'
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Adm. v. McVey, supra. It Is frequently said that where the parties
are closely related, there can be no recovery on an implied promise to
pay, and there must be an "express contract"-Allen v. Smith, 208 Ky.
207, 270 S. W. 782 (1925); Lucius' Adm. v. Owens, 198 Ky. 114, 249
S. W. 495 (1923); Nicely v. Howard, 195 Ky. 327, 242 S. W. 602 (1922);
Oliver v. Gardner, 192 Ky. 89, 232 S. W. 418 (1921); Armstrong's Adm.
v. Shannon, 177 Ky. 547, 197 S. W. 950 (1917), but it is very clear
even in the cases cited that a contract implied in fact is sufficient.
See in particular Kellum v. Browning's Adm., 23: Ky. 308, 21 S. W.
(2d) 459 (1929). It is frequently said that where the parties are
closely related a promise will not be implied from the giving and
receiving of benefits, but a better statement seems to be that the presumption exists but is met by the counter-presumption that in such
a case the services are a gratuity-Bishop v. Newman, 168 Ky. 238,
182 S. W. 165 (1916), and the presumption of gratuity is considered
the stronger-Kellum v. Browning's Adm., supra, at p. 315.
This presumption of a gratuity exists where the parties are parent
and child [Thomas v. Arthur, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 245 (1870)] brother and
sister [Price v. Price's Exr., 101 Ky. 28, 39 S. W. 429 (1897); Allen v.
Smith (supra)], or uncles and aunts and nephews and nieces-[Weir
v. Weir's Adm., 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 645 (1843); Armstrong's Adm. v.
Shannon, 177 Ky. 547, 197 S. W. 950, 1907; Kellum v. Browning's
Adm., supra.] The rule has been extended to include those who are
related other than by blood "where they occupy the same home and
render mutual services for the benefit of all"-Oliver v. Gardner,
supra (services by a step-son, overruling Hardiman's Adm. v. Crick,
131 Ky. 358, 115 S. W. 236 (1909) on this point); Nicely v. Howard,
supra (daughter-in-law); Ballard v. Ballard, 177 Ky. 253, 197 S. W.
661 (1917) (divorced daughter-in-law). It Is further said that a promise
will not be Implied from receipt of benefits since there is a presumption of gratuity "where there was a duty, moral obligation or natural
affection, or mutuality of benefit"-Kellun v. Browning's Adm., supra.
For other implied promises, see the annotations under Section 72,
infra.

Section 6. CONTACTS CLAsSirD.
Contracts are classified as formal or informal; as unilateral
or bilateral.
Annotation:
The classification Into formal and informal contracts Is not so important in this state since sealed and unsealed writings are upon the
same footing by statute. See Kentucky Statutes, Sec. 471.
The classification into unilateral and bilateral contracts is employed, but see the annotations in connection with Section 12.

Section 7. FORM&AL CONTRACTS.
Formal contracts are
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(a) Contracts under seal,
(b) Recognizances,
(c) Negotiable instruments.
Annotation:
As to sealed instruments see Sec. 6.
Although a recognizance may be enforced as a contract by an ordinary action, it may also be enforced in a summary proceeding (Kinney
v. O'Bannon's Exx., 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 692 (1869).

Section 8. CONTRACTS UNDER SFAL.
A contract under seal is a contract expressed in a writing
which is sealed and delivered by the promisor.
Comment:
a. The rules governing the formation of sealed contracts are
stated in Sections 95-110. Where peculiar incidents are attached
to such contracts after their formation, attention is called to
these incidents in appropriate connections.
Annotation:
See the annotation under Sec. 6.

Section 9. RECOGNizANCEs.
A recognizance is an acknowledgment in court by the
recognizor that he is bound to make a certain payment unless
a specified condition is performed.
comment:
a. Recognizances are in use chiefly to secure (1) the attendance in court at a future day of the recognizor, or (2) the prosecution of an action, or (3) the payment of bail.
Annotation:
With the additional requirement that the acknowledgment be
before the proper officer of the court and of record therein; this definition seems to be followed by the courts of the Commonwealth.-Kinney
v. O'Bannon's Ex'x, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 692 (1869); Commonwealth v.
McBrayer, 29 Ky. (6 J. J. Marsh) 617 (1831); Davis v. Commonwealth,
20 Ky. (4 T. B. Mon.) 113 (1827).

Section 10. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
Negotiable instruments are such bills of exchange, promissory notes and bonds as are payable to bearer, or to the order
of a specified person. By statutes, in many States, bills of
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lading and warehouse receipts, also, if running to bearer or to
the order of a specified person, are negotiable.
Comment:
a. The foregoing Section is inserted for completeness of
enumeration. The instruments referred to are to be treated
of in a Restatement especially devoted thereto. Certificates of
shares of stock are also made negotiable by statute in some states,
but such certificates do not usually contain promises.
Annotation:
Negotiable instruments are governed in Kentucky by the N. I. L.
(Ky. Stats., Secs. 3720b-1 to 195); warehouse receipts are made negotiables by Ky. Stats., Sec. 4770.

Section 11. INFORAL CONTRACTS.
Informal contracts are all others than those enumerated as
formal contracts in Section 7.
Annotation:
See annotation under Sec. 6.

Section 12. UTTATERAL AND BmATEmRA CONTRACTS.
A unilateral contract is one in which no promisor receives
a promise as consideration for his promise. A bilateral contract is one in which there are mutual promises between two
parties to the contract; each party being both a promisor and
a promisee.
Comment:
a. In a unilateral contract the exchange for the promise is
something other than a promise; in a bilateral contract promises
are exchanged for one another.
b. There must always be at least two parties to a contract,
whether unilateral or bilateral, and there must usually be an
expression of assent by each. In many cases, however, a promise
becomes a contract even though no return promise is made by
the promisee. In such cases the legal duty is unilateral, resting
on the promisor alone. The correlative legal right is also
unilateral, being possessed by the proraisee alone. The statement often made that unless both parties are bound neither is
bound is quite erroneous, as a universal statement.
Annotation:
The courts of this state recognize the distinction between unilateral
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and bilateral contracts [see Hogg v. Edley, 236 Ky. 142, 32 S. W.. (2d)
744 (1930); Aitken, Sons & Co. v. Lang's Adm., 106 Ky. 652, 51 S. W.
154 (1899)] and, in general, have used the terms as here defined and
have given effect to unilateral contracts.-Jefferson Woodworking Co.
v. Mercke, 222 Ky. 476, 1 S. W. (2d) 532 (1927); Miles v. United Oil
Co., 204 Ky. 345, 354; 264 S. W. 761 (1924); Hopkins v. Phoenix Fire
Ins. Co., 200 Ky. 365, 368; 254 S. W. 1041 (1923). But some confusion
in language has arisen due to a further use of the word "unilateral"
to refer to a promise or agreement unsupported by any consideration,
particularly where there was an offer to enter into a bilateral contract
and the required promise was not given, or if given was indefinite or
illusory. See Pennagrade Oil & Gas Co. v. Martin, 211 Ky. 137, 277
S. W. 302 (1925) ; Hendricks v. Butt, 197 Ky. 443, 247 S. W. 357 (1923) ;
Paragon Oil Co. v. Hughes & Sons, 193 Ky. 532, 236 S. W. 963 (1922).
(In which a head-note writer assumed that a contract lacking In
mutuality is unilateral and wrote "A unilateral contract is unenforceable and there is no liability for its breach") Goff v. Saxon, 174 Ky.
330, 192 S. W. 24 (1917); Rehm-Zeiher Co. v. Walker Co., 156 Ky. 6,
160 S. W. 777 (1913); Killebrew v. Murray, 151 Ky. 345, 151 S. W. 662
(1912); Berry v. Frisbie, 120 Ky. 337, 86 S. W. 558 (1905).

Section 13. VOIDABLE CONTRACTS.
A voidable contract is one where one or more parties
thereto have the power, by a manifestation of election to do so,
to avoid the legal relations created by the contract; or by ratication of the contract to make it valid and enforceable.
Comment:

a. Typical instances of voidable contracts are those where
one or both parties are infants; or where the contract was induced by fraud, mistake or duress; or where breach of a
warranty or of another promise justifies the injured party in
rescinding a bargain or avoiding its legal effect. Usually the
power to avoid is confined to one party of the contract, but
where, for instance, both parties are infants, or where both
parties enter into the contract under such a mutual mistake as
affords ground for rescission by a court of equity, the contract
may be voidable by either one of the parties.
b. The consequence of avoidance in some cases is to entitle
the party who avoids the contract to be restored to a position
as good as that which he occupied immediately before the formation of the contract; in other cases to leave the situation of the
parties in the same condition as at the time of the avoidance.
c. In many cases it is a condition qualifying a power of
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avoidance that the original situation of the parties can be and
shall be restored at least substantially, but this is not necessarily
the case. An infant, for instance, in many jurisdictions is
allowed to avoid his contract without this qualification, so that
when the infant exercises his power the parties frequently are
left in a very different situation from that which existed when
the contract was made.
d. In some contracts included under the designation of
voidable contracts, it is unnecessary for one who wishes to avoid
them to take promptly the position of an actor. No manifestation of intention is necessary until an action is brought against
him. He may, however, by ratifying the transaction make the
contract enforceable.
e. Where both parties have a power of avoidance the propriety of calling the transaction a voidable contract rather than
calling the transaction void, is due to the fact that action is
necessary in order to prevent the contract from producing the
ordinary legal consequences of a contract; and often this action
in order to be effectual must be taken promptly. Moreover,
ratification by either party may terminate his power of avoidance.
Annotation :
This definition is in accord with the law of Kentucky. Voidable
contracts are treated in detail in later sections of the Restatement in connection with fraud, mistake, duress, etc. For general
statements see the following decisions: As to the effect of intoxication,
Glenn v. Martin, 179 Ky. 295 (1918), 200 S. W. 456; intoxication
plus unfair bargain, Matthis v. O'Brien, 137 Ky. 651, 126 S. W. 156
(1910); fraud, Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Edmonson, 218 Ky.
825, 292 S. W. 511 (1927); mental incapacity, Collins v. Isaacs, 231
Ky. 377, 21 S. W. (2d) 474 (1929); mistake, Sheeran v. Irvin, 230 Ky.
307, 19 S. W. (2d) 976 (1929); unilateral--mistake caused by the other
party, Germer v. Gambill, 140 Ky. 469, 131 S. W. 268 (1910); duress,
Watson v. Watson, 190 Ky. 270, 227 S. W. 270 (1921); Wiley v. Wiley,
178 Ky. 501, 199 S. W. 47 (1917); infancy, Marceilliac v. Stevens, 206
Ky. 383, 267 S. W. 229 (1924); coverture, K. S., sec. 2128.

Section 14. UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS.
An unenforceable contract is one which the law does not
enforce by legal proceedings, but recognizes in some indirect
or collateral way as creating a duty of performance, though
there has been no ratification.
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Comment:
a. Both voidable and unenforceable contracts, as they have
been classified in the Restatement of this Subject, frequently
involve a power on the part of one or the other of the parties to
create the full contractual rights and duties of an ordinary
contract. If this were their only effect they might be classified
together; but in the transactions classified as unenforceable
some legal consequences, other than the creation of a power of
ratification, follow without further action by either party.
Annotation:
It is clear that many agreements, frequently said to be void, are
merely unenforceable and have some legal consequences. The Statute
of Frauds does not make oral promises to pay the debts of another
void. Its only effect is to prevent the enforcement by suit, and if the
money is paid, it cannot be recovered-Craig v. Vanpelt, 26 Ky.
(3 J. J. M.) 489 (1829). Lessee who enters under a verbal lease within
the statute may rely on the contract to show he is not a trespasserRagsdale v. Lander, S0 Ky. 61 (18S3); Gugdell v. Duvall, 27 Ky.
(4 J. J. M.) 229 (1830). An agreement, unenforceable because of the
Statute of Frauds may be employed as a defense-Drake v. Rowe, 162
Ky. 646, 172 S. W. 1068 (1915). And a verbal lease is evidence of the
amount of rent recoverable-Ky. Statutes, sec. 2300.

(To be continued.)

